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POLICY SCIENCE IN THE LAND-GRANT  COMPLEX:
A PERSPECTIVE  ON NATURAL  RESOURCE  ECONOMICS
Alan  Randall
Natural  resource  economics  has  long  been  cannot complete  the task alone: at  some points,
identified  as  a  policy  science.  Its  chief  con-  the argument relies  on judgment.
cerns-problems  attributable  to  "market  fail-
ures" of various kinds (e.g., Castle  1965) and the  RESOURCE ECONOMICS  AND
special difficulties  that arise in intertemporal  and  THE POLICY PROCESS
intergenerational  resource  allocation  (e.g.,  Resource  economics  seeks  to  generate  the
Solow)-inherently  require  some kind of public Solow)-inerently  require  sme  kind of information that influences policy arid,  in solution, whether it be by reaffirmation  or redef-  ki  of information  at iuenes pi  an,  i
inition  of property  rights,  regulation,  taxation  so  ots moe creie  o  it treats  var-
policy, or public  enterprise.  ious aspects  of the policy process  itself as sub-
pon a t  ime  of some  enterpral disenchantmenwit  jects for study. Thus, it can be placed in perspec-
Ina timeof  some general disenc  tmnt  h  tive  only via  a more  general  examination  of the government and selective retrenchment  of public g.  overn.  ment.  •policy  process  and the  role of economic  science sector  activity,  resource  economists  (and many  therein
other social and economic scientists) are receiv-
ing mixed signals.  Mostly we tend to work in or  The Purpose of Policy  and the Prescriptive Power
for the public sector, the political stock of which  of Economics
is  not exactly  booming.  To some  extent we  are  The  purpose  of policy  is,  surely,  to  do  good.
associated  with  the  search  for  environmental  More  specifically,  it  is  to  use  the  powers  that
quality, which search seems to be slipping a little  individuals  delegate  to  the  collective  (i.e.,  gov-
on the  political  agenda,  but  holding  firm in  the  ernment) to serve the public interest and promote
public  opinion  polls  (Council  on  Environmental  social  well-being.
Quality;  Resources  for  the  Future,  Inc.).  Al-  What  then,  does  the  economist  know  about
though we are  linked with the public  sector, we  what  is good?  Economic  science  has  long  been
are firmly associated  with the goal of efficiency  concerned  with  the  concept  of the  social  good
in that sector and in the relationships among pub-  and its implementation  in economic planning.  In
lic  and private sectors,  a goal that is ascendant.  a long  and  tortuous  intellectual  history,  utilitar-
Finally,  among  those  of us  in  the  USDA/land-  ianism;  the  compensation  test (potential Pareto-
grant college  complex,  there are  some who fear  improvement)  approach;  and  the  Samuelson-
that  we  may  be  considered  somewhat  periph-  Bergson  social  welfare  function  have  been  pro-
eral-not to society  in general,  but  to the  con-  posed,  but found wanting.  Arrow has denied the
cerns of the traditional leadership and clientele of  possibility  of a single decision rule  that will  un-
that  complex-and  thus  more  expendable  than  ambiguously  determine  which outcomes  are op-
others  in  a  worst-case  austerity  scenario.  In  timal for society, without violating a minimal  set
summary,  the times are uncertain and the signals  of individualistic and democratic precepts. While
are mixed.  the interpretation  of Arrow's result is controver-
Reactions  to uncertainty and perceived insecu-  sial,  more  recent  analyses  have  generated  a
rity  may  run the  gamut from  calm reflection  to  plethora of specialized "impossibility theorems"
blind  panic.  My  personal  reaction  tends  rather  (Kelly).  To  my  way  of thinking,  the  most  in-
markedly  toward  the  "calm  reflection"  end  of  tellectually  satisfying  approach  to  defining  the
that  spectrum;  I  find  considerable  strength  and  social  good is that of Buchanan,  building  on the
reinforcement in scholarly,  scientific and institu-  work  of Rawls.  Equity,  or  social justice,  is de-
tional traditions.  However, conceptual rigor and  fined in terms  of process,  rather than  outcome.
logical  construction  are  surely helpful,  but they  Justice is whatever emerges from just processes.
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85Rather  than attempting  to  define  equitable  out-  tion to "The Decision Maker"  about the "possi-
comes  for society,  this  approach  seeks to estab-  bility function,"  that is, the outcomes of alterna-
lish the  characteristics  of a just process  through  tive resource allocations and the foregone oppor-
which  the  members  of society may  reach  a col-  tunities  each  entails.  "The  Decision  Maker"
lective decision.  specifies the objectives  of policy and decides the
In  brief,  the  Rawls-Buchanan  approach  has  course of action.  However,  I do  not see the role
considerable  intellectual  appeal,  but  little  im-  of the  economist  in  the  policy process  in these
mediate  prescriptive  power.  If the  economist  is  terms,  and  it  is  crucial  to  the  argument  that I
to contribute to the public policy process, it must  explain why.
be as a generator and disseminator of fundamen-  "The Decision Maker"  is a fiction; not merely
tally limited information, rather than as an arbiter  a  convenient  abstraction,  but  a  fundamentally
of good and evil.  misleading  fiction.  Blaug  says  that policy  deci-
Fortunately,  there is  some guidance  available  sions are made by teams; and that objectives  and
for the economic profession as it seeks to achieve  outcomes  depend  on which  team  member  is  in
some quality control over the information it gen-  the ascendency  at  a given moment.  Braybrooke
erates  and  disseminates.  The notion of scientific  and Lindblom suggest that the policy team starts
objectivity  is  also  defined  in  terms  of process,  not  with  defined  objectives  but  with  existing
rather  than  outcome.  The  process  of  scientific  policies,  and  operates  via  disjointed  incremen-
objectivity involves the freedom and responsibil-  talism, a process in which both ends  and  means
ity of the scientist  to pose refutable and testable  are  adjusted  piecemeal.  However,  none  of this
hypotheses;  test  them  with  relevant  evidence;  goes  far enough for  me.  Drawing on  some  two
and  report  the  nature  of  the  hypothesis,  the  decades  of public choice literature, 1I visualize a
structure of the test, and the results of testing in a  policy process  that is  very  diffuse,  with  a wide
manner accessible to all interested persons (Pop-  variety of interests involved,  and a large number
per).  While  the  importance  of  the  first  two  of different arenas offering themselves as loci for
clauses is self-evident to all of those raised in the  conflict  resolution:  electoral  politics;  legislative
hypothesis-testing  tradition  of  modern  science,  and  administrative  institutions  at  the  federal,
perhaps  the  third  clause  needs  elaboration.  Its  state, and local levels; quasi-governmental  orga-
purpose  is to encourage the process of criticism,  nizations; the judicial system, with its courts and
refutation,  and  confirmation  among  the  scien-  professional  advocates;  the  public  information
tist's peer group and  others who feel themselves  media; and markets, large and small, but all sub-
so qualified.  The structure of the hypothesis,  the  ject to law.
logical consistency of the proposed test, and the  In such a system, no one is entirely above self-
quality  of the  data  and  the  analysis  brought  to  interest.  Even  within  government,  different
bear upon it must be able to withstand criticism,  agencies  may pursue  conflicting  goals; and  indi-
if the  results  are  to gain  credence.  If an  experi-  vidual  public  servants  may  pursue  individual
ment or a statistical analysis  is involved,  the re-  goals  not  always  congruent  with  those  of their
suits  must  be  replicable  by  independent  re-  department  or the administration  as a whole.  In-
searchers,  if they  are to be long believed.  dividuals within and without government  will al-
The  process  of  scientific  objectivity  serves  a  locate their endowments-and  endowments  are
valuable  role within the economics  profession in  broadly defined to include, for example,  political
controlling  the quality  of information  generated  contacts  and  information-media  skills,  in  addi-
and disseminated,  and facilitating critical evalua-  tion to income,  wealth,  education,  and technical
tion  of  the  information  in  circulation-serving  skills-across  the  various  decision  loci,  to
the policy process.  However,  scientific  objectiv-  achieve  their  objectives.  They  may  invest  in
ity is  entirely  inadequate  for (and even  inappli-  order to  maximize  within existing institutions  or
cable  to)  the process of developing  a consensus  to  maximize  via  institution-changing  behaviors.
on goals.  Individuals will perceive  their best strategies  dif-
~~The Policy  Process  ~ferently  and behave  accordingly.
The  distinction  between  government  and  the
As  Blaug indicates,  the  typical textbook  mes-  rest of society becomes blurred.2 Individuals will
sage on the role of the economist as technocrat  (I  seek  some  things  through  markets,  and  others
prefer  "humble  technician")  in  the  policy  through  a variety of government  institutions.  In-
arena-which  message  is  a kind of popularized  dividuals  will  seek to  use  the  power  of govern-
version  of Robbins'  doctrine  (1935,  1981)-sees  ment  institutions to modify market behavior and
the  economist  as  providing  value-free  informa-  market  outcomes.  Individuals  will consider  gov-
'  Rausser  et  al.  have  identified  three  variants  of the public choice  approach  (along  with a fourth  approach  to endogenous  government  behavior,  which  derives from a
radical-Marxian  perspective  and  is  thus generically  quite  different from  the public  choice  approach).  These are (I)  the  liberal-pluralist  approach  associated  with  Downs;
Buchanan  and Tullock;  (2)  the theory  of regulation  and  income  redistribution  approach,  associated with  Stigler;  Posner;  Peltzman;  Becker (1965);  and  (3)  the rent-seeking
society  approach  associated  with  Krueger.  These  variants  are in  many  ways  mutually  compatible,  and  recent  writings (e.g.  Buchanan,  Tollison  and  Tullock)  suggest the
emergence  of a more  integrated paradigm.  My approach,  while more intuitive  than  formalized,  in  this  rendition, draws  upon all three  variants.
2 Government  and  society  should not be  viewed as  separate  and exogenous;  rather,  government is  best viewed  as endogenous  to society.  Nevertheless,  there  remains a
division of labor between government  and the private  sector. The dividing line is fuzzy in  some instances,  but it is crystal  clear in others:  the judiciary,  for example,  belongs in
government. The  interactions  between  the judiciary  and  the rest  of society,  however,  are wonderfully  complex.
86ernment a potential employer; entrepreneurs  will  rected  toward  clarifying  and  even  promoting
consider  government  a  potential  purchaser,  goals.  Communications  directly  with  a  super-
pricemaker,  and,  perhaps,  a provider  of  subsi-  visor (himself a decision-middleman  or an overt
dized inputs.  The policy process  is diffuse,  and  representative  of  some  special  cause)  may
almost everyone  plays  some part  and  has  some  legitimately  co-exist  with  open  publication  di-
influence  therein.  rected  at the  scholarly,  policy-community,  edu-
Channels of communication  are diffuse,  rather  cated  lay-person,  and  general  public  audiences.
than linear.3 It is not always possible to predict in  The role model proposed here permits almost ev-
advance  which individual(s)  will  make the  final  erything that other role models permit, and some
decision or, for that matter, which of the various  additional things.
arenas  will be the locus for the final decision. In  In place  of strict ethical  requirements  that he
fact, few decisions are truly final.  Most kinds of  confine himself to the  "humble technician"  role,
decisions-the  exceptions  including,  for  exam-  E is  constrained  by his  own  professional ethics
ple,  the  irreversible  destruction of natural  envi-  (which, one hopes, include  scientific objectivity)
ronments-may be later reversed,  often at some  and by the fact that nonobjective information and
tolerable  cost.  This  being  the  case,  individuals  overtly normative positions are likely to be iden-
and coalitions that are disappointed with particu-  tified  as such  by others  in the decision process.
lar  decisions  will  continue  to  seek  reversal  of  In  that  way,  the  harm  that  an  incompetent  or
those decisions in the same arena and in others.  biased economist  might do is minimized.
This diffuse public  decision process has  a vo-  The  public  derives  its  necessary  protection
racious and omnivorous appetite for information,  from  the  would-be  economic  technocrat,  not
which is not  merely  accepted  at face value,  but  from the latter's  having taken the  "humble tech-
metabolized.  Many  divergent kinds and qualities  nician's"  vows  of  value-freedom  and  subservi-
of information-fact  oriented  and in varying de-  ence to D, but from the critical process,  which is
grees  accurate,  inaccurate,  or  intended  to  mis-  encouraged by the unrestricted flow  of informa-
lead;  goal oriented,  and in varying degrees,  con-  tion of divergent kinds and qualities.  Thus,  there
ventional  or  revolutionary-compete  for atten-  emerges a strong link between the process of sci-
tion. Participants in the policy process constantly  entific objectivity and the critical  process essen-
add  to the  stock  of  information:  evaluating  it;  tial to evaluating  information in the diffuse  deci-
promoting  the validity of some of it, while disput-  sion  process.  The  advancement  of  knowledge
ing other parts of it; and deleting that which fails  and the functioning of an open society both work
to withstand  critical examination.  best when the generation, flow, and evaluation of
information  are  not  controlled  by  a  central
The Role  of the Economist  management,  but,  instead,  emerge from  the  in-
dependent efforts of myriad thinkers,  advocates,
Since  it is seldom possible to  identify a single  and critics.
decision maker  (D)  in  such  a  system, gathering
and organizing  information  for  D, and  maximiz-  Economists  in the Land-Grant College  System
ing D's objective  function are rather implausible
roles  for the  economist  (E).  Not  only  that,  but  Recognition of the diffuse nature  of the public
many  E's  will  find  that  their  information  and  policy decision process implies awareness  of the
analyses  are  being  made  publicly  available  in  diversity  and  decentralization  that  characterize
several  different  arenas,  to many different  indi-  information  channels.  Workers  in  the  informa-
viduals  and  organizations  involved  as  partici-  tion  system (who  surely  include,  but  are by no
pants in the decision process, and, ultimately,  to  means  limited  to,  research  and  extension  per-
the general public.  E, not recognizing a single D,  sonnel in the USDA/land-grant-college  complex)
may  play  some  part  in  the  open  debate  about  responsive  to  different  clientele  groups.  They
goals and objectives; the establishment of the re-  work  under  different  kinds  of  conditions  and
search  agenda;  and,  by publicizing  his  findings,  constraints,  define  problems  differently,  gener-
may  exert  some  influence  on the way  in which  ate various kinds of outputs, and enjoy pecuniary
his results are used. E may find himself analyzing  and  prestige  rewards  in  relative  and  absolute
the decision process itself, and  actively propose  amounts. The diffuse public decision process im-
and lobby for its reform.  plies a considerable  specialization and division of
This role model for E is less restrictive in terms  labor,  even within the  sector  that generates  and
of  the  kinds  of  information  generated  and  the  disseminates  information.
permissible  patterns  of  communication.  "Posi-  While this sector, taken as a whole,  is diverse
tive" economic analyses  of the kind endorsed by  and  decentralized,  that  does  not  necessarily
Robbins  (1981)  may  legitimately  co-exist  with  imply diversity and decentralization  within every
mission-oriented  analyses  and  arguments  di-  one  of  its  component  sub-sectors.  Some  sub-
3 Linear  communications channels,  strictly defined,  work only  in two directions.  One variant, commonly  used in conceptualizing  communications within government,  is
the vertical  communication  channel,  which  works only  up and  down. A  decision  maker at the  top defines  the problem  and transmits  task statements downward,  through
several layers of staff. On completion of each task,  the resulting output is transmitted  upward until,  eventually, the decision  maker receives  the needed information.  At each
point, communication  with  "outsiders"  is  discouraged.
87sectors  (most  obviously  those  concerned  with  other in public,  more  systematized management
advocacy for particular interest,  viewpoints,  and  and  accountability  offer  our  best  hope  for  the
outcomes)  may function effectively under tightly  future.4 Whereas  research  (and,  to  a  lesser ex-
controlled,  top-down  management.  Neverthe-  tent,  extension)  in  the  land-grant  universities
less,  I  argue that the land-grant-college  complex  have  traditionally resembled cottage  industries,5
functions best when it encourages  internal diver-  there is now a tendency to promote a more indus-
sity and  decentralization  of effort.  trialized management  style.  Institutionalized pri-
University  personnel-by  nature  of their  rig-  oritizing  is being promoted to cure whatever dis-
orous education  and training,  their adherence  to  eases that arise from the customary, rather inde-
scientific  traditions  and  the process  of scientific  pendent, procedures in which scholars select the
objectivity,  the  public  nature  of their  financial  objects  of their inquiry.  While  ex post analyses
support,  and  the  traditional  dedication  of their  strongly  suggest  that  the  customary  ways  of
host  institutions  to  freedom  of expression  and  doing  things  have  been  cost-beneficial  in  the
openness  in debate  and criticism-are uniquely  past,  there  is  now  some  pressure  for research
placed  to  contribute  to generating  and  critically  resource  allocation based on ex ante analyses  of
evaluating  diverse  information  incriticism  in  an  benefits and costs.
open  society.  The  university  as  an  institution  Shumway's  reaction  to these observed  trends
evolved  specifically  to  meet these  needs,  and it  is  interesting  and  instructive.  He  stresses  the
continues  to attract personnel  whose  value  sys-  demonstrated  productivity  of the land-grant col-
tems are compatible with these specialized tasks.  lege system under its customary procedures,  and
The university is  a special kind of institution.  suggests  that a  less  decentralized  and  more  in-
The land-grant university  has always  made its  dustrialized  approach  to research  and extension
case for public support on the basis that it serves  management  may reduce  the aggregate  capacity
two  kinds  of functions:  (1) the  traditional  func-  of these institutions  to adapt to newly emerging
tion discussed immediately above; and (2) a more  realities. These concerns  are legitimate.  There is
programmatic  (or  popular)  function,  that  is,  it  an additional  argument  in favor  of decentraliza-
operates programs that directly service the needs  tion  and  diversity  within  the land-grant  college
of identifiable  clientele.  Castle  (1971)  has  as-  complex.  It  seems  that  the  complex  is  already
tutely observed the inherent tension between the  beginning to suffer some attrition to human capi-
traditional  and  popular  functions.  He  suggests  tal.  The  decline  in  relative  salaries  during  the
that,  while  this  tension  may  be  in  some  ways  past decade cannot have been helpful.  However,
constructive, there is no automatic mechanism to  I believe that a major portion of the finest talent
ensure it will be so. Thus,  any balance  is precari-  is  attracted  to  the  universities,  in  spite  of
ous  and in need of constant tending.  salaries,  by  the working  conditions  therein.  Es-
The traditional  functions  of the  university are  pecially attractive is  the encouragement of inde-
obviously directed at serving society's needs  for  pendent inquiry in an environment  that protects
a  decentralized  source  of diverse,  but  high-  the individual,  in order to free him/her to pursue
quality,  information  and  critical  evaluation.  knowledge  and excellence  with imagination  and
However, the popular functions, in many of their  creativity.  If I  am correct,  the imposition  of in-
manifestations,  may serve the same role, albeit in  stitutionalized  prioritizing,  heavy-handed  man-
a more programmatic  manner.  If there is a prob-  agement, and restrictive accountability,  in a time
lem,  it is  not with the popular functions per se.  of declining  relative  salaries,  will  surely exacer-
Rather,  the  need  is to  enhance  the  complemen-  bate  talent attrition in  the universities,  to  some
tariness  between traditional  scholarly  functions  extent  undermining  their  fundamental  raison
and the popular functions, while guarding against  d'etre as distinct institutions.
the  kinds of entanglements  with  special interest  Thus, I conclude that the needs of society, and
clientele  which  ultimately  destroy  scientific  ob-  those of the university  itself, will be best served
jectivity and undermine the claims of the univer-  by maintaining  decentralization  of effort  and di-
sity to  be a special  kind of institution.  versity  of output.
As  the  system  has  grown  in recent  decades,  At this  point,  it is  important  to  draw  a clear
there has been some inclination to emphasize the  distinction  between  decentralization  and  anar-
programmatic  functions-to  promise  targeted  chy.  It is  not my  position that research  and  ex-
programs,  an  organized  team  approach  to  tension  workers  should  be  free  from the  disci-
generating  and  disseminating  information,  and  pline of rewards and punishments, incentives and
more  streamlined  delivery  of usable  results-in  dis-incentives.  Rather, society is best served by a
order  to generate  support for continued  growth.  land-grant complex,  whose personnel retain con-
More  recently  there  has  developed  a rhetoric  siderable freedom to interpret and respond to the
promoting  the  same approaches  for survival in a  quite  considerable  array of incentives emanating
time  of austerity.  Judging  by what we  tell each  from  diverse  sources.  These  incentives  include
4 This kind of discussion was prominent at the 1981  annual meeting of AAEA. Phillips and Dalrymple wholeheartedly embrace this kind of rhetoric; and Stanton and Farrell
perhaps reluctantly,  submit to  it.
5 This  language  has a similar tone  to  that of Shumway,  who  speaks  of researchers  as  independent  entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless,  it is  well to recognize  the  role of the
university  in providing a considerable guarantee  of sustenence and  shelter for the individual  researcher.
88those established by internal fund allocation pro-  the  kinds  of information  generated  by resource
cedures,  a  wide  variety  of  extra-mural  funding  economists  includes  many  who  have  not  ac-
sources,  the  employing  institutions'  personnel  quired the habit of looking first to the colleges of
procedures,  and  the professional  and  scholarly  agriculture.
societies  that  offer  various  forms  of  individual  Many  (but by  no  means  all)  of the  aggregate
recognition which  influence  one's  standing with  efforts  of resource  economists  are  addressed  to
funding agencies  and  personnel administrations.  problems  concerning  externalities,  public goods,
For researchers,  the  necessary  conditions  for  and goods with poorly developed markets. These
success are to be funded and published, and peer  are important problems in a complex society, and
review  plays  a  considerable  role  in  both  pro-  resource  economists  are making  significant con-
cesses.  These various  incentives are themselves  tributions to their resolution.  However,  this kind
responsive,  albeit imperfectly so,  to the needs  of  of work  may  make  resource  economists  less
the  broader  society.  popular  with  commercial  interests  organized  on
By establishing  costs and rewards  for various  an industry basis  and more popular with the dif-
undertakings  and  products,  this  structure  of in-  fuse public. The resource economist may acquire
centives  bounds  the  freedom  of  individual  re-  public friends and private  enemies.
searchers  and  extension  workers  to  choose  For these reasons,  some  resource  economists
among  alternative  activities,  and  directs  effort  in the  land-grant-college  complex  exhibit  symp-
into promising  avenues.  A major role  of college  toms of insecurity.  They are concerned that their
administration  is  in  managing  the  system  of in-  area of specialization  is more nearly peripheral,
centives,  and assisting researchers and extension  than central to the concerns  of college  adminis-
workers to perceive and interpret the signals.  All  trators  and  their  traditional  clientele  groups.
of  this  I  accept.  However,  I  argue  strongly  Further, they  worry that, while  all the signs  are
against  any  major  increment  in  centralized  that the demand for resource economics  services
management  and  direction  of research  and  ex-  remains  healthy, their college administrators  are
tension.  Rather than substitute  a centralized  sig-  not well placed to assist them in tapping that de-
naling  system for the  decentralized  one that has  mand.  Clearly,  there is  a need to develop  strong
long existed, we should seek ways to improve the  linkages between  the colleges  of agriculture and
latter and defend it (Castle  1981).  those who demand resource economics  services.
It is  important that  other institutions,  special  Some,  but not all,  researchers  are skilled  at that
interests,  and  the  public  at  large  perceive  the  kind of work;  and  some, but not all,  college ad-
good  that  we  do.  Thus,  college  administrations  ministrators  have  a  comparative  advantage  in
have a considerable  task in reaffirming  the basic  reaching  the  clientele  for  resource  economics.
utility and productivity  of the  USDA/land-grant  Clearly,  there  is  work to be done.  However,  for
university research and extension  complex.  The  the  longer  haul,  there  is  reason for optimism;  I
record is such that support can be sought without  believe the demand for the things we can do is so
accompanying  promises  of radical  internal reor-  fundamentally  strong that a little hesitancy and a
ganization.  few mistakes  will not doom us to  oblivion.
Resource  Economists  in the  Land Grant
College  Complex  INTERPRETING THE SIGNALS
Here,  it  is  appropriate  to  draw  attention  to  Having  urged  rejection  of some  current  calls
specific  attributes  of  resource  economics,  and  for  institutionalized  prioritizing,  more  heavy-
develop the implications  for  professionals  in the  handed management  and accountability, it would
field.  make little sense for me, at this point, to presume
The  ties that bind resource  economics and the  to tell the profession what its priorities should be.
land-grant  colleges  of agriculture  are  simply not  Nevertheless,  a little  intelligence  relative  to the
as  direct and  strong as  those pertaining  to,  say,  incentive  signals and the short-to-mid-term  direc-
agricultural production  and marketing. Except in  tio  of their movement may be helpful to each  of
the  western  states  (where  government  influence  us, as we seek to make decentralized  and diverse
in  agricultural  factor  markets,  especially  those  decisions about allocating  our scarce intellectual
for land and water, is broad and deep),  resource  resources.
economics  is, in historical perspective,  a recently
acquired  interest  for  many  colleges  of  agricul-  Theory,  Method,  and Application
ture.  In  recent decades,  the  growth  in resource
economics  in those  colleges  has been  paralleled  Above  all,  our  institutional  and  professional
by  a  similar  growth  in  economics  departments.  rhetoric glorifies the applied; while that emphasis
Thus,  practicing  resource  economists  may  find  is appropriate,  it carries  some risks. Specifically,
that  their  peer-group  communications  network  if we  dichotomize  professional  effort  into  two
includes many who are not located in colleges of  classes-development  of  theory  and  method,
agriculture.  Similarly, the immediate clientele for  and  application-there  is  a  risk  that  the  term
89"applied"  may  develop  the  kinds  of connota-  BCA  have  fundamentally  different  roles.  Such
tions  that  suggest  it  as  a  synonym  for  "unin-  analyses may well be performed, but their results
spired and pragmatic"  and  an antonym for  "in-  are viewed  as  merely  one among  many  kinds of
novative  and  rigorous."  Rather,  "application"  informational  inputs,  and  may  serve  merely  to
should mean  something like "the  purposeful  di-  focus  attention  on  other  more  strategically  im-
rection  of  ingenuity  toward  removing  impedi-  portant elements of the problem at hand. Optimi-
ments to human progress."  Then, any dichotomy  zation  techniques  are  empirically  applied  in  a
between  theory  and method,  on  the  one  hand,  "what  if"  frame  of  mind,  and  the  sensitivity
and application,  on the other,  disappears.  Weak-  analysis is of more interest than the optimal solu-
ness in theory and method is often the immediate  tion.6 Similarly,  BCA  is  informational,  rather
impediment  to solution of applied problems.  than prescriptive.  Many of the participants in the
There have been considerable developments  in  decision  process  may  have  their  own  (substan-
theory and method during  the last decade,  many  tive  or polemical)  reasons  for wanting  to  know
of them immediately  applicable  in resource  eco-  something  about, say, the relative magnitudes of
nomics.  To mention a few:  endogenous  theories  national  economic  development  benefits  and
of government  (footnote  1);  duality theory;  the  costs. Each participant will use that information,
"new  consumption  theory"  of  Lancaster  and  along  with many other kinds  of information,  for
Becker;  hedonic  price  theory;  considerable  de-  his  own  purposes,  and  it  is  relatively  unlikely
velopments  in  consumer's  surplus  and  welfare  that any  will be in a position to impose the out-
change  measurement;  the  theory  of  discrete  come  suggested by BCA.7
choice; and  estimation methods  for discrete  and  The  diffuse  public  decision  process  implies
discrete-continuous  choice  models.  If anything,  only a limited role for optimization tools and de-
the  change  is  gaining pace.  Witness  last  year's  cision  criteria.  The  research  community  best
developments  in  welfare  measurement  in  a dis-  adapts  to  this kind  of decision  environment  by
crete  choice  framework  (Small  and  Rosen)  and  diversifying  its  output,  publishing  its  findings
exact consumer's  surplus (Hausman).  Surely, we  widely,  and  doing all it can to maintain the  open
need  to  keep  abreast of contemporary  develop-  information  channels  upon  which  the  critical
ments  in theory  and  method.  Moreover,  all but  process  demands.
the most complacent applied researcher will from
time  to time be  dissatisfied  with the capacity  of  Policy  Proposals
current  theory  and  methods  to remove  impedi-
ments  to completion  of his/her work.  When the  The  research  and  scholarly  community  is  a
immediate  problem lies  in theory or method, let  source  not  merely  of policy-relevant  facts,  but
us not allow our institutional rhetoric to divert us  also  of policy proposals.  Again,  the  concept  of
from it.  the  diffuse  decision  process  is  instructive.  If a
proposal is  to  be  implemented,  that  occurs  not
Optimization and Benefit  Cost  Analysis  through convincing  D of its validity, but through
convincing a winning coalition of interests that it
The  diffuse  model  of the  public  decision pro-  will  be to  their benefit.  The economist  who  be-
cess has clear implications  for the practitioner  of  lieves that he has identified  a worthwhile  policy
science,  in  the  way  problems  are  defined,  the  proposal  should  publicize  that  information
kinds of information generated, and the nature of  widely  so that potential  gainers and  losers have
the communication process.  an information  base on which to act.  Any worth-
In the "E provides  value-free information  and  while proposal will have its beneficiaries,  who,  of
D decides"  model of the public decision process,  all people,  should be made aware  of their poten-
optimization  and  benefit  cost  analysis  (BCA)  tial good fortune. Further, proposals with few big
have  central  roles.  D  specifies  objective  func-  losers have the best chances  of implementation.
tions to be maximized and decision criteria to be  So,  it behooves the economist to search for,  and
implemented.  The  communication  process  be-  publicize,  policy  innovations  with  built-in  com-
tween E and D may be linear:  D provides  objec-  pensation  mechanisms.  Compensation  of  those
tives and constraints  for E, who performs  analy-  who  are  now  gaining  from  inefficient  arrange-
ses  and transmits  the  results  to  D;  nobody  else  ments  may  often  be  a  reasonable  price  for
really needs  be involved.  efficiency-inducing  change (Buchanan  1977).
In the  diffuse  decision process,  many partici-
pants  seek  a  wide  variety  of information.  The  Topics for Attention
notions  of  objective  functions  to  be  maximized
and decision criteria to be strictly applied recede  The  preceding  argument  for  decentralization
into the background.  Empirical optimization  and  and diversity extends to the selection of particu-
6 Optimality concepts remain central tools in the development  of economic theory and method. The comments  in this  section are not addressed  to optimization in that role,
but to attempts  to  empirically solve  complex  optimization  models  with a view  to identifying the  "best"  alternative  solution to some practical policy  problem.
7 Recently, the Office of the President  issued a directive that elevated  the role of BCA in analysis of regulatory  initiatives;  it offers increased opportunities for benefit cost
analysts and those skilled  in valuation of non-marketed goods,  and is likely to encourage  various improvements  in the theory and application of BCA. Nevertheless,  I predict
that the technical and political limitations of BCA will eventually  become apparent, even to its promoters within the administration, and  BCA will emerge as a (fundamentally
limited) information  system rather than  a strict decision  rule.
90lar topics for the attention of researchers  and ex-  have  no influence  in the  South; however,  major
tension workers.  opportunities  will  be  lost,  it  if becomes  domi-
Not  surprisingly,  there  are  some  striking  re-  nant.  The  geography  of the South suggests  con-
gional patterns  in the  aggregate allocation  of ef-  cerns  with  marine  economics,  coastal  zone
fort to, and among, resource economics  topics in  management,  outdoor recreation,  water quantity
the  colleges  of agriculture.  For resource  econo-  in the South/West border states, and water qual-
mists, geography  and regional economy do  seem  ity  in  most  all  of  the  southern  states.  Recent
to spell  destiny. In the farm-belt states, manage-  trends  in  the  regional  economy  suggest  a  re-
ment  of the  residuals  generated  in  on-farm  ag-  examination of the "Sunbelt"  myth (Bluestone).
ricultural  production  seems  a  prime  concern,  Florida and the energy-surplus  states continue to
competition from non-farm  sources for farmland  experience  rapid  growth,  but  growth  in  the  re-
a somewhat lesser concern,  and whatever comes  maining  southern  states  seems  to  be  slowing
next  seems  to  rank  a  distant  third.  Those  in  down.  Sunshine  surely  helps,  but  it  does  not
coastal  states,  mountain  states, and  upper Great  seem to  be  a  sufficient  condition  for exuberant
Lakes  states  seem to exhibit greater  diversity  in  long-term  growth.  Nevertheless,  the  southern
their  aggregate  efforts,  and  additional  concerns  economy is performing differently from the north
receive  considerable  attention:  marine  econom-  central economy  in important  ways:  more  rapid
ics,  coastal  zone  management,  recreation  eco-  population  and  employment  growth,  and  more
nomics,  surface  and  groundwater  management,  rapid  growth  in non-farm  employment  and  met-
and  the  complex  interactions  among urban  and  ropolitan  employment.  While  agriculture  is  im-
rural  demands  for a wide  variety  of natural  re-  portant in the southern and north central regional
sources.  The western  states have  a longer tradi-  economies,  in a relative  sense,  the South is  be-
tion than most in resource economics and special  coming  less agriculture  dependent.8
concerns  with relation  to public/private  interac-  Thus, while some work on farm production re-
tions in land and water management  and forestry,  siduals,  agriculture  as  an  energy  source,  and
and  agricultural/urban  competition  for water  in  urban/agricultural  competition  for  land  are
an  arid  environment.  Concerns  with accommo-  surely  appropriate  in  southern  land-grant  col-
dating urban growth are strongest in those states  leges,  the  demand  for resource  economics  ser-
that are experiencing rapid urban growth.  On the  vices in the  South is much more broadly based.
other hand, almost all states have pockets  of de-  The  only  question  is  whether  resource  econo-
cline and  decay, and management  of those prob-  mists  in  the land-grant  colleges  will  play  a con-
lems gets a little attention  in many places.  While  siderable  role  in  servicing  these  diverse  de-
energy  is  a  hot  topic  in  popular  discussion,  its  mands,  or  will  abandon  these  fields  to  others.
ramifications  for  resource  economics  vary  ac-  Taking  the latter path  would leave  us  much the
cording  to  the regional  economy.  The  problems  worse off, by limiting our horizons, our ability to
are:  growth  management  in  the  energy-surplus  recruit new talent, and our opportunities to inter-
states; the  price  and availability  of fuel  and fer-  act with professional peers, many of whom work
tilizer, and the potential of agriculture as a source  outside  of the colleges  of agriculture.
of energy  in the  farm-belt  states;  adjustment to
increased water pumping costs in the arid  states;
and  social adjustment problems  in many states.  A  CONCLUDING COMMENT
Since  resource  economics  is,  in  historical
perspective,  a  fairly  recent  concern  in  many  My feeling is that the resource economics pro-
southern  colleges  of  agriculture,  there  is  some  fession  is not  doing badly  and  that its basic  in-
tendency  to  survey the  nation when  looking for  stincts  are  rather  sound.  We  can all  learn  from
role models.  The leadership  of many colleges  is  new ideas,  and many of us could use a little guid-
farm  oriented.  Some  of  the  finest  graduate  ance  as  we make  minor mid-course  corrections.
schoolsin  agricultural  economics  are located  in  However,  we  would  be  unwise  to  allow  our-
the farm-belt and, not surprisingly,  they educate  selves  to  be panicked into abandoning  those di-
many  of those  who  eventually  find  work  as  re-  rections  that  are  fundamentally  valid  and  tena-
source  economists  in  the  South.  For these  rea-  ble.
sons,  it may be that the farm-belt  role model en-  The  course  that  I  would  recommend  for  the
joys  a head start.  profession  in  aggregate  involves  perhaps  some
I  would not argue that this  role model  should  tilting in the direction of theory and methods  de-
8 Southern  and north  central shares  of total farm  marketings  have held fairly  constant from  1965  to  1979.
Year  Southern share %  North Central  share %
1965  30  42
1969  29  43
1974  28  46
1979  30  43
(Source:  Statistical Abstract of the U.S.,  for the  years reported).
However,  as Bluestone reports,  population, total employment, non-farm  employment, and metropolitan  employment are growing faster in the South than in the north central
region. Thus,  the relative growth  in  the southern  economy  has been  mostly non-farm  growth.
91velopment,  a  minor  reorientation  of  thinking  proach,  and output, and decentralization of deci-
about  optimization  models  and  decision  rules,  sion making about allocation of research and ex-
and  some steadfast leaning against certain winds  tension resources  are values  worth  fighting  for.
(see text circa footnote 4) that are current but, I  Our success  in this fight will eventually  be  seen
would expect,  more  ephemeral  than many of us  as  having  benefited  ourselves,  our  land-grant
perceive.  In  particular,  diversity  of topic,  ap-  complex institutions,  and the public at large.
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